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Abstract: Irving Fisher's encounter with the Quantity Theory of Money began in the 
1890s, during the debate about bimetallism, and reached its high point in 1911 with the 
publication of The Purchasing Power of Money.  His most important refinement of the 
theory, derived from his recognition of bank deposits as means of exchange, was to treat 
their out of equilibrium recursive interaction with inflation as integral to it. This treatment 
underlay both his 1920s work on the business cycle as a "dance of the dollar" and his 
advocacy of subjecting monetary policy to a legislated price stability rule, initially to be 
based on his "compensated dollar" scheme. Fisher's failure to recognize the onset of the 
Great Depression even as it was happening was directly related to his faith in the quantity 
theory's seeming implication that price level stability in and of itself guaranteed the 
continuation of prosperity, while his subsequent work on the debt deflation theory of 
great depressions initially failed to repair the damage that this failure did to his 
reputation, and to that of the quantity theory. In the 1930s Fisher nevertheless remained 
an active supporter of various schemes to reflate and then stabilize the price level. His 
subsequent influence on the quantity theory based Monetarist counter-revolution that 
began in the 1950s lay, directly, in its deployment of his analysis of expected inflation on 
nominal interest rates, and, indirectly, in its espousal of the case for subjecting monetary 
policy to a legislated rule. 
 
JEL Classifications:   B1, B2, B3, E3, E4, E5  
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"Currency is to the science of economy what the squaring of the circle is to geometry, 
or perpetual motion to mechanics"   W. S. Jevons (1875) 
 
Economic theories have lives of their own, just like economists, and one way of thinking 
about our subject's history is as a series of interactions among particular ideas and 
particular economists. The 1911 publication of The Purchasing Power of Money, whose 
centenary this conference celebrates, was a high-point in one such significant encounter, 
that between Irving Fisher, a great economic scientist with an extraordinary gift for 
simplifying complicated ideas, but also an enthusiastic – even obsessive - social and 
economic reformer, and the Quantity Theory of Money, an apparently straightforward 
positive explanation of the determination of price level, but often deployed over the years 
in normatively charged political debates about economic and social affairs. Evidently, 
Fisher and the quantity theory were well matched to one another.  
 
The Protagonists 
Fisher apparently knew himself well. In a 1924 letter to his wife, reprinted by William 
Barber et al (eds.) (1997, Vol. 13, pp. 1-2)), he remarked that "Perhaps I'm a Don Quixote 
but I'm trying to be a Paul Revere", and went on to speculate about his place in a pecking 
order that descended from "Christ, Socrates and Buddha" to "the social workers at Lowell 
House and the salvation army". Since Fisher's causes included world peace, eugenics, 
healthy living, and prohibition, such speculation was perhaps to be expected, but this 
letter's subject was another of his projects, stable money, in which he thought he had 
"found a niche in making application of my scientific training", that might enable him "to 
leave behind something more than a book on Index Numbers". This cause proved more 
durable than some of his others, and Fisher's work on its behalf contributed to a 
significant episode in the quantity theory of money's own long career, as this essay will 
argue. 
 Refined though it had become by the time Fisher took up with it, the modern 
quantity theory's roots in writings going back to sixteenth century Spain (see Marjorie 
Grice-Hutchinson, 1978) remained clearly visible, as they still would during its later 
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encounter with the monetarists, when Christopher Dow, no friend of the doctrine, would 
liken it to "a cat with nine times ninety lives, however many times discredited, never to 
die" (Dow, 1964, p. 308). As we shall see, Dow's simile is equally apt when applied to 
the quantity theory's life immediately before, during, and after its meeting with Fisher, 
who described his own version of it as follows:  
 "The price level, then, is the result of . . . five great causes . . ., normally varying 
 directly with the quantity of money (and with deposits which normally vary in 
 unison with the quantity of money), provided that the velocities of circulation and 
 the volume of trade remain unchanged, and that there be a given state of 
 development of deposit banking. This is one of the chief propositions concerning 
 the level of prices or its reciprocal, the purchasing power of money. It constitutes 
 the so-called quantity theory of money. The qualifying adverb "normally" is 
 inserted in the formulation in order to provide for the transitional periods or credit  
 cycles" (1911, p. 320 [p.364])1  
 
The Quantity Theory's Life before Fisher - Some Highlights 
The quantity theory spent the first part of the 19th century as a component of Classical 
economics. Here it was an uncontroversial explanation of the behaviour of the price level 
under inconvertible paper money. Though Classical economics also occasionally 
attributed variations in the long run equilibrium value of the price level when money was 
convertible into specie to fluctuations in its quantity in circulation, it more typically 
focused on the precious metals' cost of production under such circumstances, while 
reserving the quantity theory for short-run analysis.2 Arguably, the quantity theory's 
policy influence reached its high-point during the Classical period with the passage of the 
1844 Bank Charter Act by the British Parliament. This measure, promoted and designed 
by the Currency School, sought to put beyond question the convertibility of paper money, 
and to eliminate financial crises, by giving the Bank of England a monopoly over the 
                                                 
1 Here, and elsewhere wherever relevant, the second page reference enclosed in square brackets, is to the 
reprinted version of the work in the relevant volume of Barber et al. (eds.) (1997) 
2 David Hume's (1752) version of the doctrine is, of course, an early landmark in the Classical literature, 
with variations in the quantity in circulation of gold money, or paper money backed by gold, being invoked 
as the prime driver of the price level. Note that such words as "specie" and "precious metals" are here used 
in the text out of deference to the important and complicated role played by silver alongside gold in what 
was, down to the 1870s, an essentially bimetallic international monetary system.   
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issue of paper currency in England and requiring it to hold 100% specie reserves (on the 
margin) against its note issue.3  This arrangement was supposed to make the quantity of 
notes in circulation automatically and immediately responsive to the balance of 
payments, and hence quickly to stabilize the price level to an extent sufficient to 
eliminate financial crises initiated by inflows followed by sudden outflows of the 
precious metals.  
 As is well known, though this Act remained in place until 1914, and did put 
convertibility beyond serious question, it failed abjectly to achieve its stabilization goal 
from the very start, in some measure because the version of the quantity theory 
underpinning it, unlike Fisher's of 1911, defined the money stock that influenced the 
price level as notes and coin alone, what we would now call currency. Hence the Act 
made no allowances for the growing importance in the monetary system of deposit 
banking in general, and of deposits transferable by cheque in particular, developments 
that themselves received a considerable boost from the phased elimination of the English 
commercial banks' private note issue that it decreed. In the wake of this conspicuous 
failure of a particular version of the quantity theory, Banking School ideas which, under 
gold convertibility, attributed a largely passive role to the quantity of money and relied 
on the Classical cost of production theory of value to explain the price level, came to 
dominate policy thinking for a while.4   
 But the quantity theory's mid-19th century demise was neither complete nor long-
lasting. Even during the 1850s and '60s, shocks to the world's gold supply originating in 
California and Australia  began to undermine the presumption, underlying much Classical 
thinking, that stability of the price of money in terms of gold also guaranteed stability of 
the price of goods in terms of money. Furthermore, the slow deflation that began in the 
1870s, following the re-adoption of the gold standard by the United States after the Civil 
War, and its adoption by the newly founded German empire after its own foundation, as 
well as the consequent abandonment of bimetallism in France and elsewhere, drove this 
                                                 
3 Thjs Act applied only to England. Parallel legislation extended its principles to Scotland, but preserved 
the issue of private bank notes there, albeit only when backed by 100 per cent reserves of Bank of England 
notes.  
4 The literature on this Act and the Banking School – Currency School debate that surrounded it is 
voluminous. For an excellent recent account of it, with ample references to earlier discussions, See Arie 
Arnon  (2010) especially Part 3. 
 6
lesson home further. Along with these developments, which had been rendered all too 
visible by the simultaneous and rapid development of usable index numbers, the rise to 
dominance within economic theory of ideas about marginal utility made cost of 
production increasingly untenable as an explanation of the value of anything, including 
the precious metals, and therefore of the purchasing power of convertible money. In due 
course, then, and modified both in the light of its earlier failure and of the particular 
purposes to which it was now to be put, a revived quantity theory of money emerged to 
fill a developing intellectual vacuum that stretched from the very foundations of the 
theory of the price level to the practicalities of monetary policy.5  
 
Fisher and the Quantity Theory Meet 
Fisher's long association with the quantity theory began at precisely this juncture, 
specifically in the context of a highly politicized American monetary debate which would 
reach its climax in the presidential election of 1896.6 The basic economic content of this 
"bimetallic controversy", as it is usually labeled, was straightforward. The quantity theory 
explained the slow deflation of the era as a consequence of the failure of the world's 
supply of gold to keep pace with its rapidly growing monetary uses; and to the extent that 
deflation seemed to require a policy response, the quantity theory also provided one, 
namely an increase in the rate of money growth. The bimetallists' specific proposal was 
to introduce (or re-introduce) silver alongside gold at a fixed relative price into a 
monetary system from which, in the case of the United States, it had been excluded by 
the Specie Resumption Act of 1873, a measure which would quickly be labeled a "crime" 
by its political opponents.  
 Bimetallism was an international movement, strongly represented in Britain 
among other places, but nowhere did it become as central to everyday politics as in the 
United States, where it appealed to diverse group of supporters made up, according to 
Francis A Walker (1897), of  
                                                 
5 These developments, including the role played by the quantity theory in the debate about bimetallism, are 
discussed in Laidler (1991), especially Ch. 6. 
6 It was at just this juncture that gold discoveries in the Yukon and the introduction of the cyanide process 
which permitted an expansion of gold production in South Africa, led to an overall increase in money 
growth sufficiently large to replace deflation in gold standard countries with slow but steady inflation, thus 
undermining the case for bimetallism. This inflation persisted until the outbreak of World War 1 in 1914  
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 ". . .the inhabitants of silver producing states. . .silver coinage is with them not a 
 financial but an industrial issue … those in favor of  . . . depreciated silver 
 because . . . it is the next best thing (by which they mean what we should call the 
 next worst thing) to greenbacks . . what they really want is silver inflation  . . .
 [and a] third element [who}believe that the [bimetallic] system will. . .avoid the 
 evil of a restricted money supply; secure an approximate par of exchange between 
 gold countries and silver countries, and promote stability in the value of money. ." 
 (pp 217-219)  
No less a later commentator than Milton Friedman (1992) has suggested that there was a 
good deal to be said in favour of this last position, but it was the inflationist agenda of 
western agricultural populism that took hold of William Jennings Bryan's presidential 
campaign of 1896, and the quantity theory of money's reputation certainly suffered from 
guilt by association with it, a fact of which Fisher would retrospectively make much in 
his Preface to The Purchasing Power of Money.7   
 ". . .it has lost prestige and has even come to be regarded by many as an exploded 
 fallacy. The attempts by promoters of unsound money to make improper use of 
 the quantity theory – as in the first Bryan campaign- led many sound money men 
 to [its] utter repudiation. . ." (1911 p.viii, [p. 21] ) 
 In the 1890s,  Fisher himself had been a supporter of the monetary status quo, 
though his contributions to monetary economics at this time were well detached from 
mainstream contemporary arguments for sound money, which rested on, among other 
propositions, the idea that there was something inherently "natural" about prices set in 
terms of, and money made of or convertible into, gold, and the claim that the deflation of 
the 1870s and 80s had been due to technical progress that had reduced the costs of 
production of a wide range of individual goods. Fisher was already the author of a study 
of general equilibrium analysis (Mathematical Investigations in the Theory of Value and 
Prices 1892) that emphasized the importance of utility as the source of value and also 
showed, among other things, that a market system was one equation short of the number 
needed to determine the absolute, as opposed to relative, price of anything, so it is not 
surprising that he kept his distance here.  
                                                 
7 On the political deployment of the quantity theory in these debates, See Laidler (2004)  
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 Indeed, his most important monetary study of this period, Appreciation and 
Interest (1896) actually offered limited empirical support to contemporary critics of the 
gold standard. It addressed "the question of justice between debtor and creditor" (p. 1 
[p.199]) that lay at the heart of the bimetallic debate, and enquired as to whether deflation 
had in fact redistributed wealth between these groups since the mid-1870s.  Deploying 
(and acknowledging along with other forerunners) Alfred Marshall's (1887) distinction 
between real and nominal interest rates,8 Fisher assembled a mass of empirical evidence 
to show that, in general, the behaviour of the latter seemed to reflect learning about 
deflation that was both slow and incomplete, so that, in particular, "During the last twenty 
years it has happened that the debtor is on the losing side" (p.80 [p.278])  But he also 
argued that the quantitative effect involved "does not seem capable of the deep social 
harm attributed to it" (p.81 [p.279]), and concluded that the adoption of bimetallism 
would do little to remedy it, but a great deal to create other problems. In a similar vein, 
his (1894) "Mechanics of Bimetallism", built on earlier analysis by Leon Walras (1886) 
among others, heavily qualified the view, still widely advanced in sound money circles at 
the time, that a bimetallic system was inherently prone to oscillate unstably between gold 
and silver monometallisms. Even so, Fisher explicitly refused to extend his theoretical 
results to assessing the "practical expediency of bimetallism" (p. 537, p.187]), let alone to 
supporting it 
 Obviously, these three studies all had close links to the quantity theory, but Fisher 
did not initially go out of his way to draw attention to them. It was only in the Purchasing 
Power of Money that he argued explicitly that the equation of exchange into which the 
quantity theory injected empirical substance was also the extra equation that the general 
equilibrium system needed to get from relative to money prices, that the "Fisher effect" as 
it came to be called, was involved in the mechanisms whereby the price level would 
move from one quantity theory determined equilibrium value to another, and that his 
account of the "mechanics of bimetallism" amounted to a specific application of the 
                                                 
8 I single out Marshall here among these forerunners of Fisher because the "real - nominal" usage, adopted 
by Fisher and which we still use, was his. The Marshallian source that Fisher actually cited was the third 
(1895) edition of his Principles of Economics. It is not clear that he was aware of the 1887 paper at this 
time. He does, however cite it in (1914, p. 819 [p.576]). One of the many attractive features of Fisher's 
intellectual style was has fastidiousness in acknowledging the contributions made by others, a rather rare 
practice among his contemporaries.  
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quantity theory to a particular set of monetary arrangements.9 Perhaps this was because, 
in the 1890s, Fisher was not yet fully aware of how integral to his work the quantity 
theory was already becoming, or perhaps it was because he was nervous about being 
publically associated with the dubious inflationist company it then was keeping. Either 
way, however, it is clear that his lengthy intellectual encounter with the theory in 
question had already begun. 
 
The Purchasing Power of Money 
There is an element of the reformer's exaggeration to Fisher's claim, made in the preface 
to the Purchasing Power of Money, that its role in the bimetallic controversy had so 
damaged its reputation that, "especially in America, the quantity theory needs to be re-
introduced into general knowledge".(1911, p. viii [p.21])  In fact, even there, the theory 
in question had recently been the basis of, among other works, Walker's well balanced 
case for International Bimetallism (1897) and Edwin Kemmerer's (1909) study of Money 
and Credit Instruments in their Relation to General Prices, while in Europe versions of it 
had provided starting points for Alfred Marshall (1887) and Knut Wicksell (1898), and 
would soon perform similar services for Ralph Hawtrey  (1913) and Arthur C. Pigou 
(1912, 1917); nor would it be hard to extend these lists. And there was nothing 
particularly novel in the mathematical economist Fisher's deployment of algebra in the 
theory's exposition in 1911. By then, as Thomas Humphrey (1984) has pointed out, 
quantity equations much like his (and/or Pigou's 1917) "had been largely or fully 
anticipated by at least 19 writers located in five countries over a span of 140 years", 
including, of course Simon Newcomb (1885) to whose memory Fisher actually dedicated 
the Purchasing Power of Money. 10  
.            The quantity theory nevertheless still had many critics in 1911, and in America 
they were firmly in the ascendency when it came to the design of the legislation that 
would soon lead to the establishment of the Federal Reserve System. James.L..Laughlin 
of the University of Chicago, an exponent of Banking School ideas who had been 
                                                 
9 The 1894 paper forms the basis of Chapter 7, Section 2, of the Purchasing Power of Money 
10 Pigou's article is the locus classicus of what came to be called the "Cambridge version" of the quantity 
theory, though it does not refer to the analysis it presents in these terms. It represents a self-conscious 
account on Pigou's part to stake Cambridge's (more specifically Marshall's) claim to have independently 
developed a theory of the price level strikingly similar to Fisher's. See Laidler (1991, Ch. 3) 
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bimetallism's and the quantity theory's leading American critic in the 1890s – See, e.g. 
Laughlin (1885), (1903) -  not to mention a major butt of  William H. Harvey's (1894) 
intellectually disreputable but extremely effective quantity theory related polemic Coin's 
Financial School, was excluded from direct participation here by his (Republican) 
political affiliations, but his former student Henry Parker Willis, who took the main 
responsibility for drafting the relevant legislation, shared Laughlin's views, as at this time 
did another of his former Chicago students, Wesley C. Mitchell, whose later research on 
business cycles would provide something of a foil for Fisher's work in the 1920s.11  
 In American discourse, then, the quantity theory was still on the defensive, and 
Fisher's (1911) systematic theoretical and empirically supported rehabilitation of it went 
beyond restoring its old life to opening up a new one for it. This happened not because 
Fisher presented any grand new version of the theory or insights into its workings that 
would have startled earlier adherents - he did not - but because his account of it was built 
around a few telling expository nuances, products of his theorist's gift for intellectual 
clarity. Prime examples here are provided by two features of the famous expression  
    MV + M'V'   =   PT  
 To begin with, in choosing the volume of transactions (T) as the relationship's 
scale variable Fisher gave an unambiguous emphasis in quantity theoretic analysis to the 
amount of "work" that money performs, and hence to money's role as a means of 
exchange. His Cambridge contemporaries, who created a supply and demand theory of 
the value of money, as often as not used the word "resources" to characterize the scale 
variable of their demand function. They thus created an awkward stock-flow ambiguity 
whose clarification by Keynes (1930) was a critical step in the evolution of liquidity 
preference theory, where the scale variable finally became the wealth constraint of a 
portfolio choice problem.12 This latter theory, focusing as it did on money as a store of 
value, would for good or ill eventually lead the majority of monetary economists close to 
                                                 
11 A penetrating account of the debates surrounding the creation of the Federal Reserve system, and Fisher's 
role in them, is given by Robert Dimand (2003b) , whose (2003a) paper on "Irving Fisher's Rejection of the 
so-called Business Cycle" also provides a thorough analysis of the interactions between Fisher's and 
Mitchell's treatment of this topic in the 1920s.  
12 Don Patinkin (1974) provides the classic discussion of these matters. 
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losing sight for a while of money's particular role in what Jevons (1875) had called the 
mechanism of exchange.13 This could hardly happen in work that followed Fisher's lead.  
 Even so, Fisher's specific transactions velocity formulation of the theory proved 
too demanding of data to form the basis of much subsequent work, Carl Snyder's (e.g. 
1924) efforts providing one major exception here. Its empirical implementation 
demanded that the economy-wide volume of transactions, including those in intermediate 
goods and financial assets, be measured, that an appropriate price index for this aggregate 
be constructed, and that the actual rate of turnover of money be measured too. The 
difficulties inherent here were all too visible in empirical sections of The Purchasing 
Power of Money itself, (see Laidler 1991, pp.79-82) as they were in Snyder's 
abovementioned work, and it is not surprising that, by the early 1920s, without drawing 
attention to its remoteness from what his own theory actually required, Fisher himself 
was habitually using a conventional wholesale price index in his quantitative work - see. 
e.g. (1923, 1925, 1926).  Nor is it surprising that later scholars such as Lauchlin Currie 
(e.g. 1934) who followed Fisher in treating money's means of exchange role as primary 
from the theoretical point of view nevertheless based their empirical work on an income, 
rather than transactions velocity formulation of the quantity theory.  
 Fisher's same clear emphasis on money's a means of exchange role is also 
apparent in his explicit inclusion of chequable bank deposits (M') and their own velocity 
of circulation (V') alongside currency (M,) - which he usually called money - and its 
velocity (V) on his equation's left hand side. This is in sharp contrast to the usual 
Cambridge practice of the time of treating deposit banking as a factor affecting the 
velocity of currency and discussing its influence on prices in the usually verbal 
embellishments surrounding their algebra. Formally speaking, this difference is cosmetic, 
but before long monetary economists such as Currie (e.g.1934) and James Angell (e.g. 
1936), would go a step beyond Fisher, constructing monetary aggregates by summing 
                                                 
13 Recall that even formal models of the transactions demand for money in the spirit of William Baumol 
(1952) focused explicitly and carefully on the costs of converting "bonds" into "money" but modeled the 
role of the money in trade in goods and services in terms of a completely arbitrary and often barely 
articulated "cash-in-advance" rule. 
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currency in circulation and deposits, thus extending his approach to empirical work on 
the quantity theory along lines that have been followed ever since.14   
 
The Dance of the Dollar 
More immediately important for the quantity theory's life in the 1920s however, Fisher's 
placing of M' on its left hand side enabled, indeed required, the equation's scope to be 
extended beyond explaining the long term behaviour of the price level – its central role in 
the bimetallic controversy - to deal also with shorter term fluctuations, where causation 
quite evidently ran not just from deposits to prices but, through the workings of the 
banking system, in the reverse direction as well.  His extension of the quantity theory to 
deal with these recursive interactions was the subject not only of the famous Chapter 4 of 
the Purchasing Power of Money, "Transition Periods" but of three subsequent papers, 
"The Business Cycle: Largely a 'Dance of the Dollar'" (1923), "Our Unstable Dollar and 
the So-Called Business-Cycle" (1925) and "A Statistical Relation between 
Unemployment and Price Changes" (1926). As with his exposition of the quantity theory 
itself, the novelty and importance of Fisher's contributions here stem more from 
particular matters of emphasis than from the broad outlines of his analytic story, which 
are closely related to Alfred Marshall's (e.g.1887) writings about the credit cycle.15   
 The basic mechanism deployed by both Fisher and Marshall, not to mention a 
number of Fisher's contemporaries - Ralph Hawtrey (1913) for example - relies on lags in 
the adjustment of nominal interest rates to variations in the rate of price inflation when 
the latter begins to respond to some initial shock, with this in turn affecting the 
profitability for producers of borrowing from the banks to expand output and therefore 
the rates of growth of bank lending and deposits. These monetary effects then influence 
the rate of inflation again, continuing a cumulative process that is reversed only when, for 
                                                 
14 Note however that Currie, in keeping with his theoretical emphasis on money's means of exchange role, 
constructed a narrow (essentially M1) aggregate, whereas Angell included time deposits in his broader 
(essentially M2) aggregate.  Friedman and Schwartz's  (1970) Monetary Statistics of the United States is 
major source of  information on the efforts to construct money supply series for the United States that 
preceded and formed the basis of their own work, which  provided  the quantitative basis for their (1963a) 
Monetary History  
15 Though in 1911 as in 1896, Fisher cited the Principles, albeit now the fifth (1907) edition, as his 
Marshallian source, rather than (1887). 
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some reason, nominal interest rates eventually catch up with and then overshoot the rate 
of inflation.  
 There is no need here to go into differences of detail among Fisher's specific 
version of these mechanisms and those of Hawtrey (1913, 1919) among others, which, in 
the current context, are of secondary importance.16 What matters is Fisher's unique 
perspective on the place of these mechanisms in relation to the quantity theory of money. 
Others thought of them as constituting a monetary explanation of the credit or trade 
cycle, for whose analysis, as Hawtrey (1919, p. v)) would put it, "the quantity theory by 
itself is inadequate" because it was an equilibrium relationship applicable only when "the 
quantity of credit [i.e. deposits] and money [i.e. currency] in circulation is neither 
increasing nor decreasing" (p. 46)".  For Fisher, on the other hand, they were the result of 
putting the quantity theory to work beyond its "normal" bounds on "transitional periods 
or credit cycles" - note that "or" rather than "and" is Fisher's chosen conjunction here - a 
broadening that required the recursive nature of the relationship between prices and bank 
money when the system was out of static equilibrium to be treated as integral to that 
theory.17  
 Following the routines associated with the neo-classical economic theory of his 
time, Fisher thus thought of what others called the cycle as an empirical manifestation of 
the stability experiment needed to supplement his monetary explanation of the price 
level's equilibrium value, not as an economic phenomenon in its own right, requiring an 
explanation which might or might not be monetary in nature. The catchy and much 
quoted title of his (1923) article signifies not merely that the business cycle is a monetary 
phenomenon, as for example Friedman and Schwartz (1963b) would have it, but rather 
that the cycle and the "dance of the dollar" are for all practical purposes one and the same 
thing. And Fisher's deployment of the phrase "So-Called Business-Cycle" in the title of 
his more elaborate (1925) account of these same matters carries the same message.             
                                                 
16 But not in all contexts: for a discussion of the relationship between Fisher's approach to the cycle and 
Hawtrey's from the broader standpoint of the development of neoclassical monetary economics, See Laidler 
(1991, Chs. 3 and 4). Hawtrey's analysis is notable for its original and penetrating treatment of systematic 
cyclical variations in reserve-deposit and currency-deposit ratios that anticipates later monetarist work on 
these matters, including that of Friedman and Schwartz, (1963b).  
17 On this matter, See Laidler (1999, pp. 184-185)  In some of my other writings on Fisher and the cycle – 
e.g. 1991, 2004 – I have not made this distinction with the degree of clarity I now think it merits. 
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 In the Purchasing Power of Money, the older term "credit cycle" is deployed. Its 
replacement by the phrase "business cycle" in Fisher's writings of the 1920s is surely a 
reaction to the development of a separate field of study under this label, and more 
specifically perhaps also to Wesley C. Mitchell's contributions to it (e.g. 1913, and also 
Mitchell et al. 1923). Though Fisher did not refer explicitly to these publications in the 
first two of the above-mentioned papers, he was, as Barber et al. (eds.) (Vol. 8., pp. 1 – 7) 
make clear, well aware of them and thoroughly out of sympathy with them too.18 
Mitchell's institutionalist approach to economics was not, as has sometimes been 
suggested, devoid of theory, but it was, as argued in Laidler (1999, pp. 200-201) eclectic 
and inductivist, and Mitchell had little patience for the deductivist general equilibrium 
economics that lay behind Fisher's work. Crucially in the current context, moreover, he 
presented the "business cycle" as very much a phenomenon in its own right, and indeed 
the complicated norm as far as the economy's actual behaviour was concerned: the very 
opposite, as he well understood – see Mitchell (1927) pp. 35, 465 - of Fisher's conception 
of it as no more than a symptom of an economy in transition between equilibrium price 
levels.  As Robert Dimand (2003a, pp. 132-133) puts it, business cycle theory presented 
"a leading alternative in the 1920s to the monetary economics being advanced by Fisher", 
particularly in American discourse, and Fisher's work on cyclical fluctuations in the 
1920s was in large measure a response to it. 
 Chapter 4 of the Purchasing Power of Money, where this interpretation of the 
cycle was first developed, paid essentially no attention to real variables, and Fisher's three 
later papers should be read as attempts to accommodate within his framework the 
fluctuations in these that so occupied Mitchell, an extension made all the more necessary 
by the fact that  the extremely sharp contraction of the U.S. economy in 1920-21 had put 
them firmly onto the political agenda, The seriousness with which unemployment in 
particular was now taken is quite evident from the tone of Secretary of Commerce 
Herbert Hoover's "Foreword" to Mitchell et. al's (1923) volume Business Cycles and 
                                                 
18 The third (1926) paper, does however refer explicitly to Mitchell et al (1923). See below. Note that, as 
Barber et al  (2007, Vol, 4, p. 564) tell us, Mitchell reviewed the Purchasing Power of Money in 1912,  
criticizing Fisher for devoting only one chapter – that on transition periods, of course – to what in 
Mitchell's view was in fact the central feature of the economy's behaviour.  Dimand (2003a) suggests that 
by confining his analysis of fluctuations to "transition periods" Fisher was also distancing his view of the 
quantity theory  from the claims about long-run non-neutrality of money that had become associated with it 
during the bimetallic controversy  
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Unemployment, which begins as follows: "No waste is greater than unemployment; no 
suffering is keener or more fraught with despair than that due to inability by those who 
wish to work to get jobs" (p. vi)19   
 Fisher's (1926) "Statistical Relation between Unemployment and Price Changes" 
was in part an explicit response to this book, and it made yet another effort to debunk the 
idea of the cycle as a distinct phenomenon, a purpose that has been somewhat obscured 
by its having being reprinted as Fisher (1973) in the Journal of Political Economy and 
there portrayed as presenting an early discovery the Phillips Curve, which interpretation 
was  then deployed by Milton Friedman (1975) as rhetorical cover for his own belated 
adoption of the New-classical "aggregate supply curve" version of the latter 
relationship.20 In fact Fisher's paper had nothing to do with establishing or rebutting the 
idea of an inflation unemployment trade-off, and everything to do with substituting one 
already commonly used indicator of real economic activity that had also recently attained 
considerable policy significance – the unemployment rate – for another - a measure of the 
volume of trade - which he had deployed in his two previous efforts to give empirical 
support to his quantity-theoretic interpretation of economic fluctuations.21 It is worth 
noting, furthermore, that the economic analysis it used to link price level movements to 
employment variations was startlingly old-fashioned for its time.  
 Compare Fisher (1926):  
 ". . .when the price level is rising, a business man finds his receipts rising as fast, 
 on the average, as this general rise of prices, but not his expenses, because his 
                                                 
19 Hoover's longstanding commitment to the search for policies to counter fluctuations in employment, and 
his collaboration with the economics profession in the quest, is thoroughly documented by Barber (1985)  
20 In (1968) Friedman had criticized Phillips (1958) for erroneously confusing money and real wages. In 
(1975) he attributed a second error to Phillips, namely that of having causation run from unemployment to 
inflation instead of from inflation to unemployment, as had Fisher in (1926), this as a prelude to 
expounding an essentially Lucasian version of the expectations augmented Phillips curve. But note that 
Bordo and Rockoff (2011) advance a more charitable interpretation of Friedman's treatment of this (1926) 
paper . See below for further discussion of these issues.  
21 Before the development of aggregate output data, the behaviour of the unemployment rate over time was 
a commonly used indicator of cyclical fluctuations. See Pigou's (1926, 2nd ed 1929) Industrial Fluctuations 
for an example of the systematic application of this practice. Chart 106, p. 214 in this book, apart from 
using UK data, plotting employment rather than unemployment as does Fisher, and  dispensing with 
distributed lags, is essentially the same as Fisher's (1926). In discussing his results, furthermore, Pigou 
notes that they "agree in a striking way with certain conclusions which Professor Irving Fisher has recently 
published for the United States" (p. 216) citing Fisher (1923 and 1925)    
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 expenses consist, to a large extent, of things which are contractually fixed, such as 
 interest on bonds; or rent; . . .; or salaries; or wages. . .       
 . . .  when prices are falling, expenses likewise lag behind and reduce profits . . .
 bankruptcies are increased, concerns shut down entirely or in part, and men are 
 thrown out of work." (p.49  [p.787]) 
with Marshall and Marshall (1879): 
 "The connexion [sic] between a fall in prices and a suspension of industry 
 requires to be further worked out . . . 
 . . . when prices are rising, the rise in the price of the final commodity is 
 generally more rapid than that in the price of the raw material, always more rapid 
 than in the price of labour; and when prices are falling, the fall in the price of the 
 finished commodity is generally more rapid than that in the price of the raw  
 material, always more rapid than that in the price of labour" (pp. 155-156).    
And recall also that the slowness of nominal interest rates to reflect inflation, the main 
factor that distinguishes these two passages, had also been broached by Marshall only 
eight years later, in (1887).   
 The originality or otherwise of Fisher's specific views on the causes of 
unemployment is not the  main point here, however, because these views were secondary 
to his paper's principal purpose, which was provide empirical support to his theoretical 
interpretation of cyclical fluctuations as mere by-products of the quantity theory's out-of-
equilibrium dynamics. Crucially, moreover, this theoretical viewpoint and the evidence 
adduced in its support implied, in Fisher's view, that price stability was the sine qua non 
of the economy's smooth and efficient functioning. His reforming zeal for "Stable 
Money", which received its fullest expression in his 1920 book Stabilizing the Dollar, 
was thus completely grounded in his own particular scientific understanding of the 




                                                 
22 It should be recalled, nevertheless, that, as already noted above, the price index that Fisher used in his 
empirical work in the 1920s was a wholesale commodity price index that bore little relationship to the 
transactions price level that the strict application of his version of the quantity theory would have required.  
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Stable Money in the 1920s 
The monetary instability associated with World War 1 and its immediate aftermath, in 
Europe even more than in the United States, made "Stable Money" an attractive cause in 
the early 1920s. Even so, advocacy of its explicit pursuit did not begin with Fisher, nor 
was he by any means the first to deploy the quantity theory in this enterprise. His own 
later History of the Movement (Fisher with Hans Cohrssen, 1934) begins in ancient 
Greece and China, and points out that, in more recent times, price level stability had been 
the goal of - among many others, and as we have already noted above - quantity theorists 
such as the architects of the English Bank Charter Act of 1844 and the international 
bimetallists. Nor did either Fisher in particular or quantity theorists more generally have 
any monopoly over the stable money movement in the United States in the 1920s. Old 
fashioned sound money advocates, institutionalists and even under-consumptionists were 
also involved. Apart from Fisher himself, among those associated in one way or another 
with what was founded in 1921 as the Stable Money League and in 1925 became the 
Stable Money Association, and whose names are still readily recognizable, were Waddill 
Catchings, John R. Commons, William Foster, Edwin Kemmerer, Wesley C. Mitchell, 
Carl Snyder, Henry Parker Willis, Henry Wallace, Paul Warburg, and Allyn A Young 
(See, Fisher 1934, pp. 104 et. seq.)  
 Fisher was the intellectual driving force behind this episode in the movement's 
history nevertheless, particularly in its early years, and it seems to be to him that the 
literature of economics owes the idea of legally mandating the central bank to pursue a 
stable price level as its sole policy goal. His book Stabilizing the Dollar (1920) proposed 
nothing less than that Congress should pass "an Act to the Stabilize the Dollar", and 
included a "tentative draft" of such an act as the concluding Section 10 (pp.205-213 
[pp.263-271]), of a lengthy Appendix (pp. 125-213 [pp.183-271] devoted to expounding 
the "Technical Details" of his proposals for monetary reform. The book thus made a case 
for subjecting monetary policy to legislated rules that not only set its goal – price-level 
stability - and specified how this was to be measured, but also laid out the means 
whereby it was to be achieved.  
 Curiously though, if only at first sight, and as earlier commentators such as 
Joseph Reeve (1943) and Don Patinkin (1993) have already pointed out,  those means 
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sought not to harness directly the "five great causes" that Fisher's study of the quantity 
theory had convinced him determined the price level's behaviour, but rather to sidestep 
them. Fisher did not propose to control the behaviour of the money supply (or M and M' 
in his terminology) directly so as to offset the effects of variations in the volume of 
transactions and the velocity of circulation on the price level, but rather to adopt a 
variation on the gold exchange standard which he had already canvassed earlier under the 
label "the compensated dollar", in order to bring about such control indirectly.23  
 Specifically this scheme, whose origins, development, not to mention strengths 
and weaknesses, are thoroughly documented at this conference by Jerome de Boyer des 
Roches and Rebeca Gomez Betancourt  (2011),  required first the selection and regular 
computation of a suitable price index, and then the replacement of the legal requirement 
that the dollar be convertible on demand into a fixed amount of gold by one under which 
this amount would vary with the gold price of goods, as measured by the index in 
question, so as to render the dollar convertible at one remove into a fixed bundle of those 
goods.  Obviously many detailed questions needed to be settled to make such a proposal 
operational, and the above-mentioned appendix to Stabilizing the Dollar, along with 
Fisher's work on index numbers  - (1911) Ch. 10, but particularly The Making of Index 
Numbers (1922) mentioned in the 1924 letter to his wife quoted earlier - were intended to 
do just this. There is no need here to describe the details of these efforts, let alone pass 
judgment on their adequacy.24 Suffice it to say that they were convincing enough to some 
of his contemporaries for his 1920 "Tentative Draft Act" to form the basis of the 1922 
Goldsborough Bill for "Stabilizing the Purchasing Power of Money", which, though it 
                                                 
23 The scheme was briefly discussed, though not under this label in Section 5, of the final chapter of the 
first (1911) edition of Purchasing Power of Money. The second (1913) edition of the book contains as an 
"Appendix . . .on  'Standardizing the Dollar'" - " an "extract from an address is Boston before the American 
Economic Association, December 1912, printed in the American Economic Review Supplement, March 
1913 " (pp.494-502 [pp.538-546]) in which the phrase occurs on p. 495 [p539].  
24 As de Boyer des Roches and Gomez Betencourt (2011) show, the plan as Fisher originally formulated it 
had its difficulties, especially if it was to be implemented in an essentially closed economy context, to 
which he did not provide an analytic, let alone a practical, solution until 1920. As Michael Belongia has 
pointed out to me, Holbrook Working suggested as early as (1923, p. 248) that time lags in the effect of 
money on the price level were too long to permit Fisher's scheme to stabilize the price level within the 
period of the typical business cycle, and hence needed to be supplemented by active efforts to control the 
money supply along lines whose empirical basis Working's  important and sadly neglected paper was 
largely devoted to establishing.  Also, as Boianovsky (2011) notes, Wicksell, was an early admirer of the 
compensated dollar scheme, but began to lose faith in it under the influence of David Davidson's criticisms, 
published in Swedish in (1913).   
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failed in Committee in the House of Representatives, was the subject of hearings in 
which Fisher himself, among others participated.  
 That the compensated dollar was a variation on the already existing and therefore 
familiar gold exchange standard and could perhaps also form the basis of a stable 
international monetary order if other nations also adopted it, seemed to Fisher to be 
advantages when it came to convincing others of its feasibility and desirability. And, as 
Fisher well aware by (1914), various indexation schemes had also been in circulation for 
decades, for example those of Jevons (1875) Marshall (1887) and even an anticipation of 
Fisher's own by Aneurin Williams (1892), so the idea should have been familiar at least 
to informed observers. But Fisher's proposals to tamper with traditional monetary 
arrangements were nevertheless too much for many to bear. Williams's proposals had 
provoked an immediate and  dismissive response from Sir Robert Giffen, under the title 
"Fancy Monetary Standards" (Giffen 1892), and Fisher was no better received in certain 
circles in the early 1920s. His Yale colleague, Thomas S. Adams gave him his only 
mention – in the company of Congressman Goldsborough and the 1922 Bill - in the 
entirety of Mitchell et al's (1923) Business Cycles and Unemployment, in the following 
terms. 
 " These plans, Mr. Fisher's plan in particular . . .are impractical at this time, 
 because people believe them impractical – if for no other reason. They propose to 
 lay hands upon the economic holy-of-holies, and before they can be acted upon  
 they will require an amount of critical discussion commensurate with that which 
 should be given, say, to a proposal fundamentally to alter the marriage relation" 
 (Mitchell et al (1923) p. 270) 
.     It is safe to say that Adams, his intellectual background as a Wisconsin 
institutionalist of roughly the same vintage as Commons and Young notwithstanding, did 
not understand the compensated dollar, and indeed, it is not quite clear that Congressman 
Goldsborough himself did either, for Adams quotes him as describing his Bill's purpose 
as being "to stabilize prices 'by controlling the quantity of money and credits in relation 
to the volume of trade by increasing or diminishing that quantity as the average price 
level goes down or up'" (Mitchell et al. (1923) p. 270), a summary of its intentions at 
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least as closely related to conventional quantity theory reasoning as to the compensated 
dollar per se..  
 Whatever the truth of this particular matter may be, however, it is certain that 
while attempts to legislate a price-level stability mandate for Federal Reserve System 
persisted throughout the 1920s and into the 30s, Fisher's compensated dollar scheme 
itself slowly moved into the background.25 It gave way to variations on ideas about 
"credit control", similar to those evident in Goldsborough's remark, and more in the spirit 
of Ralph Hawtrey 's (1919) or John Maynard Keynes' (1923) work on monetary 
stabilization, or indeed that of Knut Wicksell (1898), whose analysis provided the basis 
for Gustav Cassel's (1928) discussion of these matters, which was, as Thomas Humphrey 
(2002) has suggested directly related to the U.S. debate. Indeed, as Allan Meltzer (2003, 
pp. 183-1992) recounts, even the phrase "stability in the price level" would be watered 
down to "a more stable purchasing power of the dollar" in the last such bill to be 
introduced before the onset of the Depression – the almost successful second (James) 
Strong Bill of 1928, whose principal academic promoters included Commons and Allyn 
Young - apparently because of fears among some potential supporters – notably 
Governor Benjamin Strong of the New York Fed -. that the public might find the idea of 
stabilizing the general price level, as opposed to specific prices, too difficult to grasp.26  
 Fisher's influence as a monetary reformer was thus already waning after the early 
1920s, and, along with his efforts to enroll Benito Mussolini as a supporter (See Barber et 
al (eds.) 1997, Vol. 8, pp. 321-327) his main contribution to the stable money cause 
during the balance of the decade was his 1928 book The Money Illusion, which 
elaborately and even dramatically described the capacity of a price level instability to 
                                                 
25 Boianovsky's (2011) suggestion that Fisher himself began to lose confidence in this specific scheme as 
the decade progressed is plausible, in the light of the accounts that both he and de Boyer des Roches and 
Betancourt Gomez (2011) give of the criticism to which it was subjected and the practical difficulties that 
implementing it would have entailed. Certainly, by 1932, though Fisher was still keeping the scheme, or at 
least its label, on the agenda, he was willing to entertain "A simple application of the compensated dollar 
plan" that would ".rely principally upon credit control, and only at long intervals regulate the weight of the 
dollar when other means proved inadequate." (1932, p. 139) 
26 It should nevertheless be noted than among those who did understand the proposal was Keynes, who in 
(1923, pp. 147-48) singled out for approval  what it revealed about both Fisher's understanding that 
domestic price stability and exchange rate stability were sometimes in competition, and his willingness to 
give priority to the former. It should also be noted that Mitchell himself would take much more notice of 
Fisher in his (1927) Business Cycles with no fewer than 22 indexed references to his work. Dimand (2003a) 
discusses Mitchell's 1927 response to Fisher in some detail, but also notes that the amount of attention 
given to Fisher here was an anomaly in Mitchell's work.   
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undermine coherent decision making by ordinary economic agents. Fisher's faith in their 
capacity to see through the veil of money to the real economic signals that lay behind it, 
already heavily qualified in (1896) had by then diminished much further in the light of 
subsequent monetary history, and of his own personal experience in business.27 Even so, 
it was not the complexity of Fisher's own specific ideas on monetary reform that would, 
at the end of the decade, decisively undermine his standing and that of the quantity theory 
as well. Rather, it was his very public misreading of the significance of the stock market 
crash of October 1929, and of the seriousness of the subsequent real downturn of 1930-
32.      
 
The Crash and the Depression   
That Fisher misdiagnosed the behaviour of the stock market in the autumn of 1929 as 
nothing more than a bout of temporary instability is well known and requires little 
elaboration here. On October 23rd – the evening before the market broke in earnest - he 
told a meeting of the District of Columbia Bankers' Association  that " . . . we are in a 
state of rapid transition, with great prosperity at present and greater prosperity  in view in 
the future" and suggested that "these . . . rather than speculation, or these plus 
speculation, explain the high stock markets, and when it is finally rid of the lunatic fringe, 
the stock market will still never go back to 50 percent of its present level, what it was in 
1926" (Fisher 1929, p.23 [p.25]). But, he added, presumably as a last minute amendment 
to his text, "I am surprised that it should have gone back as much . . . and . . .actually has 
touched those figures. I think it will rebound again" (p.24 [p.26]) 28 
 In this same speech, Fisher attributed the past and future prosperity of the 
American economy on which his reading of the stock market rested to the systematic 
application of science to generating technical progress, the spread of scientific 
                                                 
27 For a more detailed account of Fisher's own views on this matter, and how they changed over time, see 
Appendix 1, pp. 374-398, to Stable Money. . .  (1934) 
28 The text of this, speech from which these quotations are taken, was printed for the first time in Barber et 
al.  (eds)  2007, Vol. 10. pp. 3 – 26). It was far from unknown, however. John Kenneth Galbraith, 
presumably drawing on contemporary newspaper accounts, cited it in his widely read The Great Crash. 
See, Galbraith (1955, p. 103). Note that, as Galbraith (p. 151) also pointed out, Fisher was still elaborating 
on its optimistic arguments at the very end of the year, as he prepared his (1930) The Stock Market Crash – 
and After. This substantial (286 pages) monograph is now largely forgotten. Even Barber et al. (Vol  10, p. 
31) reprint only the two paragraphs with which its final chapter "The Hopeful Outlook" ends. 
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management and its growing acceptance by the labour force, whose own productivity 
was also being enhanced by the beneficial effects of prohibition, and finally to "an 
immense impulse to prosperity through a stable price level, a more stable price level . . . 
than we ever had in half a dozen years in our lifetime, or in recorded history" ( p. 10 
[p.12]).And among these causes of prosperity and guarantees of its continuation ". . .next 
to invention, I should put stabilization of the dollar second on the list, and the most 
important" (p. 12 [p.14]). As he would note in (1932), reviewing the onset of the 
depression in late 1929 with benefit of hindsight: "One warning, however, failed to put in 
an appearance – the commodity price level did not rise" (p. 74 [p.134] Fisher's italics).  
 In 1932 Fisher found ex post rationalizations for this awkward fact of course, but 
crucial to the topic of this paper, it is clear than in 1929 it had deceived an observer who, 
since 1911, had repeatedly touted successful price level stabilization as virtually 
sufficient in itself to guarantee the continuation of overall prosperity. The quantity theory 
as he had come to understand it thus let Fisher down badly in late 1929, and the fact that 
he had relied so heavily on it in formulating his public position could not have done much 
for the quantity theory's reputation either. Nor in 1929 did Fisher simply take a public 
position. As the saying has it, his money – about $11 million of it - was also where his 
mouth was, and his continued faith in this implication of the quantity theory led to his 
financial ruin even as it also undermined the scientific reputation upon which his 
authority as a policy commentator rested.  
 Fisher's monograph Booms and Depressions (1932) was meant, in part at least, to 
repair that reputation, but it attracted little attention, perhaps just as well, given that it 
ended with a post-script dated September 1932 (p. 157-158 [p. 217-218]) proclaiming 
that "recovery seems to be in sight" (p. 157 [ p. 217]); but  he was nevertheless 
sufficiently anxious to establish the importance and originality of the "Debt Deflation 
Theory of Great Depressions" expounded in this book, and to publicize it further, that he 
took the opportunity presented by an invitation to contribute to the first issue of 
Econometrica to publish there a stand-alone summary of it (Fisher 1933b).29 The theory 
in question followed his earlier work in focusing on price level instability as the source of 
                                                 
29 A letter from Fisher, attached to an offprint of this paper located in my University's library, and reprinted 
in Appendix A below, testifies to his anxieties.   
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all other instability, but the downward spiral into depression that it described - running 
from debt-driven sales of goods through falling prices to rising real indebtedness and 
thence to further sales and price falls - went well beyond anything that could be 
characterized as an extension of the quantity theory. It was nevertheless an original 
creation and particularly in its stand-alone exposition, has by now long been recognized 
as such.30  
 Even so, in 1933 there was no novelty in the policy implications that Fisher's 
theory yielded: namely, that deflation had been destructive, reflation was urgently 
required, and once accomplished should be followed up by renewed efforts to put stable 
money into place. This basic message, and particularly its first two components, still had 
influential detractors in the United States to be sure – see for example, James L. Laughlin 
(1931), Henry Parker Willis (1932) and Gottfried von Haberler (1932) – but it also had a 
multitude of advocates other than Fisher, working on a bewildering and ever evolving 
variety of specific programs, and though Fisher would become an active supporter of 
many of these schemes, he originated none of them. The slippage in his innovative 
powers as a thinker and commentator on monetary policy issues that had already begun to 
be apparent in the mid-1920s thus became ever more evident in the 1930s even as the 
pace of his activities as an advocate seemed to accelerate   
 The following list of the monetary causes that Fisher embraced as the decade 
progressed is far from complete: in 1932 he participated in drafting and then signed  the 
now famous Harris Conference Manifesto (See Quincy Wright (ed.) 1932) urging what 
came to be called  fiscal inflationism on President Hoover; in (1933a) he advocated the 
issue of stamp scrip money, an idea implemented on a piecemeal basis in a number of 
localities during the depths of the depression, and owing its intellectual origins to the 
work of the unorthodox German economist Silvio Gesell, who would also attract a rather 
                                                 
30 In particular it seems to have provided much of the early inspiration for Hyman Minsky's long but no 
longer neglected prophesies about the inherent instability of financial markets. See for example, Minsky 
(1963). Even so, Axel Leijonhufvud has told me, in personal correspondence, that in the early 1960s, when 
a doctoral student at Northwestern, he began to develop his own version of the debt-deflation theory for 18 
months, discussing with, among others, James Tobin, William Fellner, Karl Brunner and Jack Hirschleifer, 
before anyone – David Meiselman then at the University of Chicago as it happens - alerted him to the 
existence of Fisher's earlier work. The Chicago connection here rings true, because Minsky impressed upon 
the present writer at just this time - he was my senior colleague at Berkeley between 1963 and 1965 - that 
Henry Simons had first inspired his own interest in such topics while he was an undergraduate student 
there. 
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more than passing mention from Keynes (1936, pp. 353-358); in (1934), he reiterated his 
earlier welcome (1933c) of President Roosevelt's revaluation of gold, a measure that 
surely owed more than a little to the compensated dollar idea, but was undertaken not on 
his advice, but mainly on that of the agricultural economist George F. Warren, and 
Fisher's own former student James Harvey Rogers; and he also found time to praise the 
by now well known (thanks to Lars Jonung 1979) Swedish experiment of pursuing price 
stability under fiat money by manipulating the central bank's discount rate; in 1935 he 
published 100% Money, an exposition of what by then was being called "the Chicago 
Plan" (See Hart 1935), devised as he acknowledged by Henry Simons and his colleagues, 
for subjecting demand deposits in the US to a hundred percent reserve requirement, thus 
giving the Federal Reserve system complete control over the money supply, and hence, it 
was hoped,  the price level too; and so on 31 
 Given this frenetic activity, it was perhaps appropriate that Joseph Reeve devoted 
an entire chapter to Fisher in his (1943) study of Monetary Reform Movements, but the 
fact that the only other individuals to receive similar treatment were Father Charles 
Coughlin and Senator Elmer Thomas – both of them out and out monetary cranks – also 
speaks eloquently of Fisher's by then ambiguous standing. Though Reeve recognized that 
"In terms of both the ultimate effectiveness of his monetary crusades and of the caliber of 
his economic analysis, Professor Fisher presents a striking contrast to Father Coughlin 
and Senator Thomas" his ultimate verdict on him was nevertheless that "… with his 
genius for making difficult ideas appear simple, he over-simplified some of the 
fundamental problems" (p. 184)    
 The quantity theory, Fisher's preferred tool for simplifying monetary questions, 
for a while had a better time of it than he did. It provided, for example, the intellectual 
foundations of what Milton Friedman (1956) would later call the "Chicago Tradition", to 
which the Harris Foundation Manifesto of 1932 and the "Chicago Plan" for hundred per 
cent money already mentioned above were key contributions; and the fact that later work 
                                                 
31 All of these activities, and more, are documented by Fisher himself in Stable Money. Scholars who rely 
on Barber et al.'s otherwise indispensable 14 volume edition of Fisher's Works should bear in mind that it 
finds space for less than a single page (Vol. 6, pp. 365-6) from this 452 page monograph. Note that Chicago 
economists were not the only originators of 100 per cent money proposals. Lauchlin Currie (1934) 
independently developed. his own version of the scheme, as his former undergraduate student Hart (1935) 
noted   
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has shown this tradition to have been nowhere near as unique to Chicago as Friedman 
initially suggested strengthens rather than weakens the quantity theory's claims to 
continued influence on the early 1930s.32  
 More versions of it than Fisher's were in American circulation by then, however. 
In particular, as noted earlier, Ralph Hawtrey's (1913, 1919) monetary theory of the cycle 
had started from its Cambridge version and in the later 1920s had exerted considerable 
influence on American discussions of "credit control" as a means of stabilizing the price 
level at the very time that Fisher's influence in the stable money campaign was beginning 
to wane. Hawtrey had also already canvassed "fiscal inflationism" as a means of coping 
with depression even in the 1920s – see e.g. Hawtrey (1925) - and the appearance of such 
ideas at Harvard, Chicago and elsewhere in the early 1930s probably owed more to this 
element in the quantity theory's complicated inter-war life than to its relationship with 
Fisher33.  
 But we must not make too much of these matters here. If Fisher did not originate 
any of the projects associated with the quantity theory in the 1930s, he certainly 
supported and worked hard to publicize many of them. In particular, even though it 
makes no mention of Fisher, it is difficult to imagine that Henry Simons' still famous 
"Rules versus Authorities in Monetary Policy" (1936) could have been written if Fisher's 
work on behalf of stable money had not prepared so much of the intellectual ground for 
it.  Even so, the quantity theory's influence on American economic thinking did not long 
outlast Fisher's. It came to an end, except in a few isolated instances – the work of Clark 
Warburton (see 1966) being a notable example - with the arrival on the scene in 1936 of 
Keynes's General Theory, and with a suddenness that confirms that it was already on its 
last legs. The most severe economic downturn in history had, after all, arrived without 
prior warning from the price level, and this serious empirical failing could not be 
                                                 
32 Beginning with Don Patinkin (1969) Friedman's claims on behalf of the Chicago tradition generated a 
lengthy and sometime acrimonious debate. For a general account of the complex development of American 
monetary economics in the early 1930s, including a view of Chicago's place in it, see Laidler (1999) Ch. 9   
33 The term Fiscal Inflation may originate from its use as the title of Chapter 14 of Joseph Reeve (1943), a 
book based on a Ph.D thesis completed at Chicago in 1938, and which deserves more attention from 
historians of this period than it has received. Fiscal inflationism involves the deployment of deficit 
spending, not so much as a means of influencing aggregate demand in its own right, but as a means of 
creating government debt that can then be monetized for this purpose.  
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obscured by the quantity theory's subsequent usefulness as a source of insight into the 
dangers of falling prices and the likely benefits of reflation.  
 Furthermore, by 1936 an alternative way of understanding the significance of 
monetary phenomena for the workings of a market economy had already been developing 
for almost four decades. At first, this Wicksell Connection, as Axel Leijonhufvud (1981) 
would label it, had seemed to be another extension of the quantity theory, designed to 
incorporate phenomena associated with banking, roughly parallel to Fisher's.34 But by the 
1920s it was already apparent that it had the capacity to shift the focus of monetary 
economics away the influence of the quantity of money on the price level - and perhaps 
on real variables too by way of transitional side effects - to the influence of the rate of 
interest on saving and investment, and by that direct route on the level of real economic 
activity as well - though perhaps with side effects on the price level. When the 
Depression struck, this line of thought had not yet found an expression simple enough to 
command wide assent and hence replace the quantity theory in general discourse. In 
1936, however, the General Theory gave it just that, and one of the quantity theory's 
more interesting lives came to an abrupt end.35          
  
The Quantity Theory's Life after Fisher – Some Highlights 
The Keynesian ascendency did not last for ever, of course, and the opening manifesto - 
Friedman ed. (1956) - of what Harry Johnson (1971) would call the Monetarist counter-
revolution bore the name Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money. Since this volume's 
five empirical studies dealt with the influence of the quantity of money on the price level 
in various historical episodes, its title was entirely appropriate, but the model expounded 
in Friedman's opening essay as a "Restatement" of the quantity theory was firmly in a 
Cambridge, even Keynesian to some eyes (see Patinkin 1969, 1974), tradition, not a 
Fisherian one. Only one of the volume's contributors - Richard Selden in his "Monetary 
Velocity in the United States" - cited Fisher; nor was he mentioned at all in a subsequent 
Chicago collection of quantity theoretic studies, David Meiselman (1968), while his 
                                                 
34 This indeed is exactly how Fisher himself treated Wicksell's work, which he acknowledges in Chapter 4 
of the Purchasing Power of Money. And Wicksell himself gave his readers many reasons to interpret him 
along these lines. See Laidler (1991) Ch. 5. The main theme of Boianovsky (2011) is of course the parallel 
development of Fisherian and Wicksellian monetary economics, and their divergence, in subsequent years.   
35 This is one of the major themes explored in Laidler (1999) 
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name appeared only four times in the index to Friedman and Schwartz's (1963a) 
Monetary History of the United States – one time less than Edwin Kemmerer's.  
 Moreover, though Friedman and Schwartz did explicitly evoke Fisher's phrase "a 
dance of the dollar" in the introduction to their (1963b) account of "Money and the 
Business Cycle", it is not a little ironic that their subsequent analysis bore the hallmarks 
of Mitchell's National Bureau, that their account of cyclical transmission mechanisms 
harked back to Hawtrey by way of Cagan (1965) in stressing systematic variations in the 
currency-deposit and reserve-deposit ratios, and that where the sequence of Fisher's dance 
had gone from money growth to inflation to real variables and back to money growth, 
theirs put variations in nominal income at the centre of things, and showed that the 
breakdown of these between their real income and price level components had the former 
systematically in the lead.36  Finally, to the extent that there is any pre-echo in Fisher's 
writings of Friedman and Schwartz's emphasis on the influence of disequilibria between 
supplies and demands for stocks of monetary and financial assets on expenditure flows – 
a feature that their work shared with that of their fellow monetarists Karl Brunner and 
Allan Meltzer - See (1993) for a retrospective summary -  it is to be found in a single 
(1933) paragraph in which, as almost an aside, Fisher refers to ". . .the direct effect of 
lessened money, deposits, and their velocity, in curtailing trade, as evidenced by the fact 
that trade has been revived locally by emergency [presumably scrip] money without any 
raising of the price level".(1933b, p. 342, [p. 328]) But Fisher was here finally catching 
up to an element in the transmission mechanism that Hawtrey has been canvassing with 
increasing emphasis since (1913 see especially. p. 65), though he seems to have been 
quite unaware of this. 
 To find any lasting effect of its earlier encounter with Fisher on the quantity 
theory's monetarist life, we must consider the so-called Fisher effect.37  First taken up by 
                                                 
36 There is a puzzle here. Fisher's charts and Pigou's too – see fn. 18 above – show inflation slightly leading 
unemployment, quite contrary to Friedman and Schwartz's stylized facts about the timing of changes in 
variables over the cycle. Perhaps the difference here arises from the fact that both Fisher and Pigou use 
wholesale price indices dominated by commodity prices which were presumable determined in what we 
would, following John Hicks (1974), call flexprice markets, whereas Friedman and Schwartz are usually 
discussing the behaviour of national income deflators dominated by Hicksian fixprices.  
37 This is also the view of Bordo and Rockoff (2011), who's more general influence on this section of the 
current paper should be explicitly acknowledged. Note, however, that by the early 1970s, in the context of 
then ongoing debates about the role of monetary  as opposed to cost-push influences in generating inflation 
 28
Fisher in (1896), and largely forgotten during the Keynesian episode, this would become 
the centerpiece of monetarism's explanation of why, during periods of expansionary 
monetary policy, nominal interest rates tended to rise, instead of fall as the prevailing 
orthodoxy of 1950s and 60s seemed to have it. More important, it was also explicitly 
invoked by Friedman in his seminal 1967 AEA presidential address (Friedman 1968), 
more specifically in that paper's section on "Employment as a Criterion of Policy" where 
he developed his "natural unemployment rate" hypothesis by introducing inflation 
expectations into the Phillips curve.38  Having referred to "the Irving Fisher distinction 
between the nominal and the real rate of interest" as "the one wrinkle we have added" (p. 
102) to Wicksell's analysis of the natural interest rate, he then warned that Phillips work 
contains a basic defect: "the failure to distinguish between nominal wages and real 
wages- just as Wicksell's analysis failed to distinguish between nominal interest rates and 
real interest rates. Implicitly Phillips wrote his articles for a world in which everyone 
anticipated that nominal prices would be stable" (p. 102)39 
 Crucial in the current context, moreover, the natural unemployment rate 
hypothesis immensely strengthened the essentially Fisherian case that Friedman (e.g. 
1958) had long been making that monetary policy could be directed only at controlling 
the price level, and should be legally constrained to this task. To be sure his money 
growth rule was not a price level rule, but his choice here rested on technical judgments 
about what was feasible, not on any deep theoretical reasons. "Stable Money" in Fisher's 
sense was also Friedman's aim, even if the immediate influence on him was Henry 
Simons. It is thus hard to resist the conclusion that the quantity theory's involvement with 




                                                                                                                                                 
in the United States,  Friedman was paying more attention to Fisher the quantity theorist, as Dimand 
(2011), citing Friedman (1972), points out.  
38 As noted earlier, Fisher knew that the distinction between real and nominal interest rates appeared in 
Marshall's work, as indeed did the vocabulary itself. Even so, the much greater clarity with which Fisher 
(1896) brought to bear on the role of expectations as opposed to realizations of inflation in this context 
entitles him to the credit that Friedman gives him here.  
39 Wicksell was not, of course, quite as innocent of this distinction as Friedman suggested – See Laidler 
(1991, pp. 134-5) and especially Boianovsky (2011) 
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Concluding Comment: The Quantity Theory in Limbo  
At the time of writing, the quantity theory is yet again in limbo. Its most recent demise 
had two causes, each a new manifestation of an old weakness. First, money growth 
targeting, a practical, but diluted, application of Friedman's policy proposals, did not 
work well, and this happened in some measure because its adoption provoked 
institutional adaptations that then undermined it. This should not have come as a surprise 
to anyone aware of what the consequences of the 1844 Bank Charter had been for the 
quantity theory's reputation in an earlier era, but evidently it did. Second, the New-
classical money-supply surprise model of the cycle - a still quantity-theory-based 
successor to Friedman and Schwartz's monetarist approach - reformulated the 
expectations-augmented Phillips curve as an aggregate supply curve and hence reverted 
to Fisher's (1911, 1923, 1925 and 1926) hypothesis that price level fluctuations led those 
in real variables in the transmission mechanism of monetary impulses. It  thus set itself 
up for gross empirical failure when faced with the basic facts of the timing of the real and 
nominal responses to monetary impulses that Friedman and Schwartz, among others, had 
so thoroughly documented in the meanwhile.40  
 Given these two failures, it was not surprising that most macroeconomists would 
soon discard the quantity theory and succumb to real business cycle theory and New-
Keynesian economics, neither of which leaves any significant space for money to play a 
role in the economy, The goal of stable money, in the guise of inflation targets, 
nevertheless survived the quantity theory's disappearance for a while, only to be 
threatened by yet another repetition of history, namely the apparent failure before 2008, 
as before 1929, of the price level to give a clear warning about the approach of a major 
economic crisis.  Whether all this means that the quantity theory is finally dead, or only 
that it has gone into hiding prior to beginning yet another of its nine times ninety lives, 
remains to be seen.Historians of economics will be inclined to bet on the latter 
possibility, and therefore continue to take an interest in this doctrine's earlier 
incarnations, not least the one which Irving Fisher did so much to shape.              
 
 
                                                 
40 But see, nevertheless, fn.36, above. 
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Appendix A.   Letter from Professor Irving Fisher to an Unknown Recipient 
 
The following is the text of a typed letter attached to an offprint from Econometrica of 
Fisher (1933) that is held in the D. B, Weldon Library at the University of Western 
Ontario. The letter is on what appears to be Fisher's personal notepaper, bearing the 
printed heading    
 
    Professor Irving Fisher  
      460 Prospect Street  
    New Haven, Connecticut  
 
It is dated, simply, November, 1933. Though bearing what appears to be Fisher's hand 
written signature, the letter itself reads as if it were a circular sent out to many recipients. 
There is nothing to indicate who, among the very small number of economists at that time 
located at the University of Western Ontario might have received Fisher's offprint. My 
colleague Jim Davies suggests that the most likely recipient was the then head of the 
Department of Economics and Political Science, Harold Logan, a labour economist who 
had done graduate work at Chicago, or perhaps his eventual successor in that position, 
Mark Inman, a then recently appointed Ph.D.from Harvard. But the fact that anyone 
connected to what was then a small regional university did so suggests that Fisher 
distributed it rather widely. The text follows. 
 
My dear Sir: [sic] 
 I am sending you a reprint of my article in the October number of "Econometrica" 
on the "Debt-Deflation Theory of Great Depressions". 
 If my chief contention is correct, namely that the main secret of great depressions 
usually lies in the fact that the effort to reduce debt really increases it [underlining in 
original] under certain circumstances and tends to produce the many consequences noted 
in the article (and elaborated in "Booms and Depressions"), and if the "debt-deflation 
theory" is "both new and important", I am naturally anxious that this reprint shall reach 
all serious students of so-called cycle theory. 
 I did not try, in "Booms and Depressions" itself, to make any specific claims but 
merely made a very general statement in the preface. This was partly because of my 
unfamiliarity with the literature (although thus far no one has found the theory definitely 
anticipated). Moreover the book was written for immediate usefulness and I feared that, if 
I emphasized the newness of the theory, I might excite distrust in the lay reader. 
 But now that the theory is being widely accepted, I fear it may not be traced to the 
proper source and that my book may be regarded merely as a popularization of previously 
accepted conclusions. 
 I would be grateful if you can supply me with any additional names of "cycle" 
students and still more if you can indicate any anticipations of this theory other than the 
few partial anticipations noted in the article. 
       Very sincerely, 
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